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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for organized crime (mexico)
11 results foundAuthor: Moyano, Inigo Guevara Title: Adapting, Transforming, and Modernizing Under Fire: The Mexican Military 2006-11 Summary: Mexico’s armed forces are in the midst of a transformation to better perform in an ongoing war against organized crime. Their role and visibility have escalated considerably since President Felipe Calderon assumed office in December of 2006. Although the fight against organized crime is clearly a law enforcement matter, the absence of effective and accountable police forces has meant that the Army, Navy, and Air Force have been used as supplementary forces to defend the civilian population and enforce the rule of law. While the federal government has striven to stand up a capable police force in order to relieve and eventually replace the military, that possibility is still distant. Five years into the Calderon administration, the armed forces continue to be the main implementers of the National Security policy, aimed at employing the use of force to disrupt the operational capacity of organized crime. Their strong institutional tradition, professionalism, submission to political control, and history of interaction with the population mainly through disaster relief efforts have made them the most trusted institution in Mexican society. Mexico’s armed forces have long been used as an instrument of the state to implement all kinds of public policies at the national level, from emergency vaccinations, to post-earthquake rescue, to reforestation campaigns. They have been at the forefront of disaster relief operations in reaction to the calamities of nature, within and beyond their borders, with humanitarian assistance deployments to Indonesia, the United States, Haiti, and Central America among the most recent. The Mexican armed forces are quite unique, as they are divided into two separate cabinet-level ministries: the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (the Secretary of National Defense or SEDENA), which encompasses the Army and Air Force, and the Secretaría de Marina (the Secretary of the Navy or SEMAR), which comprises the Navy. The level of engagement with society and the results obtained from this division in military power confirms the utility of their independence. Their use as the state’s last line of defense has led to severe criticism from opinion leaders, opposition forces, international analysts, and human rights organizations. Their level of commitment remains unaltered and they have undertaken a number of significant transformations to better address their continued roles as the guardians of the State and protectors of the population. Details: Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Letort Paper: Accessed September 29, 2011 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1081.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1081.pdf Shelf Number: 122957 Keywords: Armed ForcesMilitary ForcesOrganized Crime (Mexico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Felbab-Brown, Vanda Title: Calderon's Caldron: Lessons from Mexico's Battle Against Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and Michoacan Summary: Over the past several years Mexico has suffered from drug-trade-related violence, extraordinarily intense and grisly even by criminal market standards. Its drug trafficking organizations have been engaged in ever-spiraling turf wars over smuggling routes and corruption networks, turning the streets of some Mexican cities into macabre displays of gun fights and murders. The criminal groups have shown a determined willingness to fight Mexican law enforcement and security forces and an increasing ambition to control other illicit and informal economies in Mexico and to extort legal businesses. Finding Mexican police forces pervaded by corruption and lacking the capacity to effectively deal with organized crime, President Felipe Calderón dispatched the military into Mexico’s streets. Yet while scoring some successes in capturing prominent drug traffickers, the military too has found it enormously difficult to suppress the violence and reduce the insecurity of Mexican citizens. Institutional reforms to improve the police forces and justice system, although crucial for expanding the rule of law in Mexico, have been slow and will inevitably require years of committed effort. Meanwhile, patience among many Mexicans with the battle against the criminal groups is starting to run out. To a degree unprecedented in the history of U.S.-Mexican relations, Mexico has welcomed U.S. cooperation in combating organized crime. An assistance package approved in 2008 by the U.S. Congress and called The Merida Initiative first focused on beefing up Mexican law enforcement agencies through technological transfers and intelligence sharing. A subsequent iteration of the U.S. approach adopted in 2009 and referred to as Beyond Merida emphasized deeper institutional reforms. It also expanded the scope of policies to combat illicit economies in Mexico by emphasizing socio-economic approaches to strengthen the resilience of communities against organized crime. But the government of Mexico has found the U.S. partnership lacking and has complained about the persistence of demand for drugs in the United States and the flows of guns and criminal money from the United States to Mexico. This monograph explores the effectiveness of the security and law enforcement and socio-economic approaches adopted in Mexico over the past several years to combat the drug trafficking organizations. It also analyzes the evolution of organized crime in Mexico, including in reaction to anti-crime actions taken by the Mexican government. It is based on fieldwork I undertook in Mexico in October 2009 and particularly in March 2011. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, Latin America Initiative, 2011. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 3, 2011 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/09_calderon_felbab_brown/09_calderon_felbab_brown.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/09_calderon_felbab_brown/09_calderon_felbab_brown.pdf Shelf Number: 122966 Keywords: Drug TraffickingOrganized Crime (Mexico)Political Corruption |
Author: Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto Title: Living in Fear: Social Penetration of Criminal Organizations in Mexico Summary: Citizens in Mexico are trapped in between two illegitimate forces { the criminal organizations and the police who are supposed to protect them. Through the use of list experiments within the Survey on Public Safety and Governance in Mexico (SPSGM), we measure the pervasiveness of drug gang activity as it pertains to strategies of coercion (extortion) and co- optation (offering help) to ordinary citizens. The paper seeks to provide a better understanding of which groups are most vulnerable and where is it that drug gangs have become most embedded in society. Our findings suggest that although narcotra cantes extort citizens the most in high violence regions and the police does so in low violence ones, both forms of extortion are present everywhere in Mexico. This has triggered a spiral of fear: drug gangs signal unambiguously that they are in control, they overtly operate in many of Mexico's localities, while the police can't credibly signal that they can regain control of the streets. Police corruption is hence an essen- tial part of the story of Mexico's violence. Ever more fearful citizens have turned to the narcos for help, we demonstrate, and hence many tacitly {or even openly{ support them. Public strategies emphasizing military action and harsh treatment might not affect the social embeddedness that protects drug gangs and criminal organizations, even though it is a necessary action in the short-run. Instead, enhancing citizen trust within communities by effectively cleaning the police forces while improving the adjudication of justice are more likely to strengthen the social fabric. Details: San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 2011. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 3, 2012 at: http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/001/502967.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/001/502967.pdf Shelf Number: 124810 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug ViolenceGangsOrganized Crime (Mexico)Police Corruption |
Author: Rodriguez Cuevas, Jose A. Title: The Balloon Effect and Mexican Homeland Security: What it Means to be the Weakest Link in the Americas’ Security Chain Summary: The sudden increase in crime and violence in some Mexican cities and regions has raised security concerns not only in Mexico, where President Felipe Calderon categorized these crimes as a threat to Mexican society, but also in the United States, where Department of Homeland Secretary head Janet Napolitano referred to stemming the violence as “vital to core U.S. national interests.” Mexico is concerned with the latent threat of violence spreading all over the nation, while the U.S. is trying to guard against spillover. Both governments are concerned by the increased violence and its impact on communities along the U.S.–Mexican border. Because of its geopolitical location along the southern U.S. border, Mexico is susceptible to possible undesired effects of U.S. strategies. These unintended, second-degree consequences are known as “balloon effects,” after the airflow inside a balloon when constriction applied to one area sends pressure to another area in the balloon, thinning and weakening its wall. Since 2006, Mexico’s strategy for countering transnational organized crime and related activities has sent the balloon effect in two directions: first, inside Mexico, where government actions have unbalanced the criminal structure, creating balloon effects inside Mexican territory; and second, within the U.S. while asking to escalate the Mexican effort to improve its anti-crime strategy with U.S. assistance has escalated conflict and led to a holistic strategy against transnational organized crime and related activities in the Americas. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 85p. Source: Internet Resoruce: Thesis: Accessed July 3, 2012 at: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/December/11Dec_Rodriguez_Cuevas.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/December/11Dec_Rodriguez_Cuevas.pdf Shelf Number: 125464 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceHomeland SecurityOrganized Crime (Mexico) |
Author: Moreno Gómez, Edgar Title: Staging the War on Drugs: Media and Organised Crime in Mexico Summary: The steep upsurge in the number of drug‐related homicides in Mexico has been matched by an even greater increase in the news coverage of violence and organised crime. However, both journalists and scholars have overlooked how organised crime makes use of the media and vice versa. By drawing on previous research on the relationship between the media, terrorism and public opinion this Working Paper looks into the rise of mass‐mediated organised crime in Mexico. Based on a quantitative analysis of the news coverage of violence and organised crime in three major newspapers as well as a qualitative study of selected events, the paper offers an insight to understand the political ramifications of the news coverage of violence. Even when drug trafficking organisations are not terrorists who seek the publicity of the press to advance a political cause, this paper shows that they have important goals related to the media, the impact of news on public opinion and the consequent influence over policy making. Details: Madrid: Elcano Royal Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2012. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Elcano Royal Institute Working Papers No. 8: Accessed August 2, 2012 at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=147776 Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=147776 Shelf Number: 125843 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingHomicidesOrganized Crime (Mexico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Olson, Eric L. Title: Considering New Strategies for Confronting Organized Crime in Mexico Summary: Mexico has experienced an unprecedented rise in crime and violence over the past five years with over 47,000 people killed in crime related violence during this period. For some, the increase in violence is a tragic by-product of President Calderón’s full frontal assault on criminal organizations. For others, the government’s actions, while well intended, have only marginally impacted trafficking while exacerbating the violence. Whatever the reasons, both Mexico and the United States are entering a critical period where decisions about the future of security cooperation and crime fighting strategies come more sharply into focus. Both countries will hold presidential and congressional elections in 2012 giving policy-makers and the public an opportunity to take stock of the bi-national security strategies pursued thus far, and debate the best strategies going forward. While it is unlikely that the framework of “shared responsibility” and close bilateral collaboration will be upended, regardless of the election results, 2012 represents an important opportunity to assess the strategies to date and refine our understanding of the security threats posed by organized crime, violence, illegal drug use and trafficking in both Mexico and the United States. To this end, the Mexico Institute brought together a number of leading scholars and experts to discuss and analyze the nature of security threats the U.S. and Mexico face from organized crime. The result has been the compilation herein of cutting edge analysis and innovative approaches reflecting some of the latest research and information available about drug trafficking, organized crime and violence in Mexico. Together these ideas challenge much of the conventional wisdom and commonly held assumptions about Mexico. They suggest important new strategic directions for both countries that build on what has already been tried, while redirecting current strategies to prioritize reducing the violence associated with trafficking and organized crime. Details: Washington, DC: Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2012. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 13, 2012 at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/New%20Strategies_1.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/New%20Strategies_1.pdf Shelf Number: 126022 Keywords: Crime Reduction (Mexico)Organized Crime (Mexico)Violent Crime (Mexico) |
Author: Southern Pulse Title: Acapulco Criminal Environment - June 2012 Summary: In recent years, the Acapulco Metropolitan Zone (AMZ) has experienced some of the highest levels of criminal violence in Mexico. The AMZ presents an interesting case where two small criminal organizations have battled for territorial control of the city with the external support of much larger cartels operating at the national level. The AMZ also provides a snapshot of how the criminal environment evolves as organizations adapt, and ultimately present a public security challenge that neither the Mexican government nor many international businesses are prepared to confront. As a contribution to the ongoing conversation about the direction of public security in Mexico, Southern Pulse published in January 2012 its first ebook, Beyond 2012, which presented a chapter on public security in Mexico. This chapter concluded with a consideration of a future when “super-empowered” street gangs will eclipse groups such as Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation: As we theorized in 2005, the devolution of Los Zetas, of the Gulf Cartel, and the predictable dissolution of the Sinaloa Federation points to the formation of several criminal organizations, not a Mega Cartel. Whereas Mexico under the guise of six large, national-level criminal enterprises in 2006 could have been considered a sea of tranquility punctuated by islands of violence (less than 100 municipalities out of 2,000-plus with violence) the opposite may be proven true by early 2014, as the number of well-armed criminal groups jumps from the six significant groups we counted in 2006 - Sinaloa Federation, La Familia, Gulf Cartel, Beltra-Leyva Organization, Arellano-Felix Organization, Carrillo-Fuentes Organization - to over 10 in 2012 with a steady growth of new groups to bring the total number to possibly over 20 by the end of 2014. By the end of 2014, the men organized by El Chapo and his principal rival Heriberto Lazcano will no longer be the principal drivers of violence across Mexico. At the hyper-local level, super-powered street gangs, armed with Twitter, You Tube, the weapon of fear, and an enviable armory will man-handle local politicians and municipal police. We believe that while the above process continues forward beyond June 2012, there are certain cities in Mexico today that present an advanced case of how the criminal system in Mexico will evolve as street gangs become more powerful. Acapulco lists among the top four, which include Monterrey (See Monterrey Street Gangs Report), Guadalajara, and Juarez. A fifth city, Tijuana, will serve as a “control case,” where we see the historical dominance of one group to be a harbinger of less violence and little to no development of street gangs. Within this brief report, we would like to present our assessment of the criminal environment in Acapulco from both a strategic and tactical viewpoint to support an understanding of how the evolving criminal system in Acapulco could impact the daily lives of those who live there, as well as the business, particularly in the tourism industry, operating in the area. Just as we stated in our March 2012 city report on the Monterrey Metropolitan Area (MMA), we would like to add that in the best interest of time and space, this report on criminal activity in the AMZ makes some general assumptions: The top-tier transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are the primary drivers behind violence in Mexico in 2012; The Mexican government will not significantly alter its current strategy in 2012 or beyond, into the next administration; TCOs in Mexico are in constant communication with leadership elements of street gangs; TCOs do not solely rely on drug trafficking as a source of illicit revenue; and, The line between TCOs and street gangs is so blurred that many in Mexico still consider the two to be one single unit of criminality. Details: Annapolis, MD: Southern Pulse, 2012. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 14, 2012 at http://www.southernpulse.com/e-books/acapulco-criminal-environment Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.southernpulse.com/e-books/acapulco-criminal-environment Shelf Number: 126694 Keywords: Evaluative StudiesGangs (Mexico)Organized Crime (Mexico)Transnational Crime |
Author: Southern Pulse Title: Monterrey Street Gangs - March 2012 Summary: The greater Monterrey metropolitan area (MMA) presents a compelling story of how transnational organized crime can from one moment to the next bring a city to a halt, snap from the picture of serenity to a “narco terror” attack, or evolve from an island of security to a significant cause for concern. As Mexico’s industrial powerhouse in the north, Monterrey is a case of resiliency within a strong business community to protect its city. It is also a case of how street gangs evolve, adapt, and ultimately present a public security challenge that neither the Mexican government nor many international businesses are prepared to confront. To contribute to the conversation about the direction of public security in Mexico, Southern Pulse published in January 2012 its first ebook, Beyond 2012, which presented a chapter on public security in Mexico. This chapter concluded with a consideration of a future when “super-empowered” street gangs will eclipse groups such as Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation: As we theorized in 2005, the devolution of Los Zetas, of the Gulf Cartel, and the predictable dissolution of the Sinaloa Federation points to the formation of several criminal organizations, not a Mega Cartel. Whereas Mexico under the guise of six large, national-level criminal enterprises in 2006 could have been considered a sea of tranquility punctuated by islands of violence (less than 100 municipalities out of 2,000-plus with violence) the opposite may be proven true by early 2014, as the number of well-armed criminal groups jumps from the six significant groups we counted in 2006 - Sinaloa Federation, La Familia, Gulf Cartel, Beltra-Leyva Organization, Arellano-Felix Organization, Carrillo-Fuentes Organization - to over 10 in 2012 with a steady growth of new groups to bring the total number to possibly over 20 by the end of 2014. By the end of 2014, the men organized by El Chapo and his principal rival Heriberto Lazcano will no longer be the principal drivers of violence across Mexico. At the hyper-local level, super-powered street gangs, armed with Twitter, You Tube, the weapon of fear, and an enviable armory will man-handle local politicians and municipal police. We believe that while the above process continues forward beyond March 2012, there are certain cities in Mexico today that present an advanced case of how the criminal system in Mexico will evolve as street gangs become more powerful. Monterrey lists among the top five. Within this brief report, Monterrey Street Gangs, we would like to present our assessment of street gang activity in Monterrey from both a strategic and tactical viewpoint to support an understanding of how the evolving criminal system in Monterrey could impact the daily lives of those who live there, as well as the business operations of the dozens of companies that rely on the MMA as a crucial element of a global enterprise. We would like to add that in the best interest of time and space, this primer on street gangs in the MMA makes some general assumptions: The top-tier transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are the primary drivers behind violence in Mexico in 2012; The Mexican government will not significantly alter its current strategy in 2012 or beyond, into the next administration; TCOs in Mexico are in constant communication with leadership elements of street gangs; TCOs do not solely rely on drug trafficking as a source of illicit revenue; and, The line between TCOs and street gangs is so blurred that many in Mexico still consider the two to be one single unit of criminality. Though outside the scope of this report, the above issues hold value and are certainly open to conversation and argument. We would welcome any opportunity to discuss with you the above topics, and how they play into the overall criminal system in Mexico. Details: Annapolis, MD: Southern Pulse, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 14, 2012 at http://www.southernpulse.com/reports/monterrey-street-gangs-march-2012?A=SearchResult&SearchID=5324185&ObjectID=4182275&ObjectType=35 Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.southernpulse.com/reports/monterrey-street-gangs-march-2012?A=SearchResult&SearchID=5324185&ObjectID=4182275&ObjectType=35 Shelf Number: 126695 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Mexico)Organized Crime (Mexico)Street Gangs (Mexico)Transnational Crime |
Author: Guerrero-Gutiérrez, Eduardo Title: Security, Drugs, and Violence In Mexico: A Survey. 7th North American Forum, Washington, DC, 2011 Summary: The survey is composed by five sections. The first one is a diagnosis with two components. The first one is a brief description of Mexico’s security institutions. The survey includes a brief update of the most significant changes on these institutions during the last year, especially a report on the current situation of the police forces. The second component has to do with the present dynamics of Mexican organized crime. Here, the survey provides an account of Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations, including the different criminal activities these organizations perform, their geographic distribution, and the relationships among them. Also, the fragmentation of some of these organizations is described, and a new typology of cartels is included. The second section is about organized crime violence. Considering that violence trends are changing quickly this survey includes a general update of the phenomenon. In addition to the factors that explain increases of violence, the survey also points out the main factors that explain the geographic dispersion of violence as well as its regional specifics. The third section reviews the government’s strategy and actions against organized crime. This section includes an analysis of the outcomes of the Federal Government’s deployment of the force against organized crime through “joint operations” (operativos conjuntos), and an assessment of the government’s security policy impact on violence levels. The fourth section describes the general traits of the Mexican and North American drug markets. Finally, the fifth section addresses Mexican public opinion; it brings together the results of recent polls regarding security and government actions against organized crime, and provides an account of the government’s communication strategy on security issues. This Survey’s Data Sources The survey exhibits extensive public data from Mexican government agencies, and from American and international agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice and United Nations. Some tables and figures derive from two databases constructed by the author, through the systematic recollection of information in newspapers, weekly magazines, and press releases from official agencies. The first database shows the number of organized crime executions. For its construction more than 30,000 news articles related to organized crime homicides were collected. These articles were taken from the following 19 national and regional newspapers: Crónica, El Economista, El Financiero, El Gráfico, El Norte, El Sol de México, El Universal, Excélsior, Imagen, Impacto, La Jornada, La Prensa, La Razón, La Segunda de Ovaciones, Metro, Milenio, Ovaciones, Reforma, and UnoMásUno. This database is complementary to the official one, which has not been updated since December 2010. The second database contains information on 1,029 messages placed by criminal organizations next to corpses of executed individuals. Details: Mexico: Lantia Consultores, S.C., 2011. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2013 at: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6716/NAF_2011_EG_(Final).pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6716/NAF_2011_EG_(Final).pdf Shelf Number: 127617 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug Abuse and CrimeDrug TraffickingOrganized Crime (Mexico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Olson, Eric L. Title: Is More Getting Us Less? Real Solutions for Securing Our Border Summary: Ongoing reports about Mexico’s bloody conflict with organized crime have raised again the question of whether the United States should do more to prevent such violence from “spilling over” into the country. While officials have documented few cases of actual “spill over,” fears of exploding violence in Mexico and concerns about illegal migration are driving a policy debate that is centered on “securing the border.” To whit, President Barack Obama announced last May the deployment of 1,200 more National Guard troops to enhance border security, and requested an additional $500 million from Congress to further modernize southwestern border security. In August, the U.S. Congress approved a $600 million “Border Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2010” in near record time. The question is whether such policy actions are effective. Details: Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2013 at: http://welcometheimmigrant.squarespace.com/storage/Is_More_Getting_Us_Less_021511.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://welcometheimmigrant.squarespace.com/storage/Is_More_Getting_Us_Less_021511.pdf Shelf Number: 127619 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityCriminal CartelsOrganized Crime (Mexico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Bunker, Robert J. Title: Cartel Car Bombings in Mexico Summary: Contemporary Mexican cartel use of car bombs began in mid-July 2010 and has since escalated. Given the proximity to the United States, some literally within miles of the border, the car bombings, with about 20 incidents identified over the last 2 1/2 years, should be of interest to local, state, and federal U.S. law enforcement, the U.S. Army, and other governmental institutions which are providing increasing support to Mexican federal agencies. An historical overview and analysis of cartel car bomb use in Mexico provides context, insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns. In order to generate insights into future cartel car bombings in Mexico, the identification of such potentials offers a glimpse into cartel "enemy intent," a possible form of actionable strategic intelligence. For Mexico, steady and both slowly and quickly increasing car bomb use trajectories may exist. The prognosis for decreasing car bomb deployment appears unlikely. If cartel car bombs were to be deployed on U.S. soil or against U.S. personnel and facilities in Mexico, such as our consulates, we could expect that a pattern of indications and warnings (I&W) would be evident prior to such an attack(s). In that case, I&W would be drawn from precursor events such as grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks (or attempted attacks) on our personnel and facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb deployment patterns in Mexico. The authors conclude with initial recommendations for U.S. Army and defense community support to the military and the federal, state, and local police agencies of the Mexican state, and the various U.S. federal, state, and local police agencies operating near the U.S.-Mexican border. The extent of support in intelligence, organization, training, and equipment is highlighted, as well as the extent that these forms of support should be implemented to counter cartel vehicle-borne IEDs and overall cartel threats. Details: Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Letort Papers: Accessed August 21, 2014 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1166.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1166.pdf Shelf Number: 130006 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceOrganized Crime (Mexico) |